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options for the reader to consider’ (ibid.). Interpreting Hume’s views on 
religion is no easy task, but Yoder’s interpretation is rather forced and it 
is hard not to see the author projecting his own views onto Hume.
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earl Stanley b. Fronda does not want to give a  new interpretation of 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion. His book is more or less the 
defence of the orthodox Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion against 
its widespread criticism. Although the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of religion given by Dewi Zephaniah Phillips and other 
followers of Wittgenstein is very well known among Wittgenstein 
scholars, there are still rather unconvincing prejudices concerning this 
subject in the academic community. There are still many philosophers 
who claim that Wittgenstein was a  fideist, a  non-realist, or a  crypto 
atheist. Fronda wants to show that none of these claims is true. He argues 
that it is necessary to adopt the perspective of apophatic theology if you 
do not want to misunderstand Wittgenstein. This idea is very well known 
since the 60ies and 70ies of the last century, although in the last decade 
no scholar defended this idea as intensely as Fronda does. As Fronda 
did not deal more deeply with Wittgenstein’s and Wittgensteinian 
philosophy of religion before 2005 and as Fronda seems to have been 
confronted with many strong prejudices against Wittgenstein, he thinks 
that it is necessary to write a  book which shows that many scholars 
still misunderstand Wittgenstein as a  fideist. Thus, although there is 
nothing new in Fronda’s book and nearly nothing of deeper interest for 
Wittgenstein scholars, it may be a helpful book for people who are not 
so familiar with Wittgenstein’s religious thought searching for a  first 
introduction. For serious scholarly work, it might be interesting how 
profoundly Fronda stresses the importance of apophatic theology for 
the understanding of the whole philosophical work of Wittgenstein. 
Although this idea is rather familiar in Wittgensteinian scholarship, it 
has – as far as I know – never been elaborated at such length before.
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Fronda’s argument runs as follows: When Wittgenstein pretends that 
he cannot help seeing everything from a religious point of view, Fronda 
states that this perspective is obviously the perspective of mysticism (p. 22). 
In chapter 2, Fronda convincingly shows some parallels between the early 
Wittgenstein’s theology and the mystical approach of Pseudo-Dionysius 
(pp. 27-52). While this approach is rather conventional, it is interesting that 
Fronda shows in chapter 3 that the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein 
is still consistent with this mystical interpretation (pp. 53-77). moreover, 
he tries to explain how the mature Wittgenstein opens possibilities of – 
via criteria – speaking affirmatively of God (pp.  79-107). In chapter 5, 
Fronda argues that ‘God exists’ is a grammatical statement for the later 
Wittgenstein, and that St. Thomas Aquinas held a very similar position 
(pp. 109-128). The problem with this chapter is that Fronda follows very 
much Norman malcolm’s interpretation of St. Anselm’s argument of 
‘God exists’ as a necessary statement and that the different philosophical 
approach of St. Thomas is not reflected in Fronda’s book. Naturally, it is 
true that St. Thomas, like all philosophers in the theistic tradition, knows 
that God cannot be thought of as an object among other objects (p. 124). 
but ideas like this really are not specific enough to talk of a ‘Wittgenstein 
à la St. Thomas’ like Fronda does (p. 128). And the distinction between 
Platonic and Aristotelian thinking is too important to connect it in the 
way Fronda does.
In chapter 6, Fronda shows that miracles, extraordinary religious 
experiences, and the orderliness of the universe are no good evidence for 
God’s existence from Wittgenstein’s point of view (pp. 129-155). Thus, 
the ‘supposed body of evidence that is supposed to justify religious belief 
is itself a product of the same sort of religious belief that it is supposed to 
justify’ (p. 129). Although these observations are true and also helpful, 
for example for the current debates on reformed epistemology, it is a pity 
that the author does not try to show how the subject of foundation of 
faith can be dealt with constructively from Wittgenstein’s perspective.
After elaborating on Wittgenstein’s attitude towards traditional 
philosophical theistic arguments, Fronda deals with Wittgenstein’s ideas 
on religious language. His main point is that Wittgenstein does not adopt 
a non-realistic view of religious language, but a  ‘religious realism with 
attitude’, i.e. a realism which is developed from a certain world picture 
without stating anything on reality beyond this word-picture-depending 
approach (pp. 157-187). In chapter 8, Fronda resumes discussing how 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion is so often misunderstood and that 
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the mainstream of philosophy of religion as the mainstream in analytical 
philosophy is anti-Wittgensteinian (pp. 189-211). Against this sceptical 
denial of Wittgenstein, Fronda tries to show again that there are already 
important theological roots for Wittgenstein’s thinking in medieval 
philosophy – especially in the platonic line of thinking. In this tradition 
God is conceived as ontologically, epistemologically and semantically 
transcendent (p. 204). Although this tradition obviously exists in 
Christianity, I  wonder whether the wholly-otherness of God really is 
a very convincing approach to theology. It seems to me that especially 
the later Wittgenstein also offers other ways for theology, and Fronda 
does not choose the most convincing one. Thus, Fronda’s last defence 
of Wittgenstein in his concluding remarks (pp. 213-229) certainly is 
a  legitimate and possible interpretation of Wittgenstein – considering 
especially the work of the early Wittgenstein. but whether there is no 
alternative to the idea that Wittgenstein’s point of view is the point of 
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Theology, Evolution and the Mind (henceforth Tem) is an edited volume 
that contains the papers presented in the conference of the Science and 
Religion Forum in Canterbury in 2007. The volume tackles highly topical 
and controversial issues in theology and science: the nature of biological 
evolution and its theological implications, theological anthropology in the 
context of human evolution and the nature of human minds and brains. 
These issues are crucial for science, philosophy and theology, and deserve 
extensive, rigorous and critical treatment. unfortunately, this is what the 
volume, for the most part, cannot offer. The book is all too short to deal 
extensively with the issues it raises. Further, the articles are very uneven 
with respect to scope and the level of argumentation, and lack much 
needed philosophical rigor. but perhaps the value of an edited volume 
does not lie in its coherence and length only, but in the strength of the 
